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| LEADER |
01868cam a2200385 4500 |
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PPN067151418 |
| 003 |
http://www.sudoc.fr/067151418 |
| 005 |
20161219155300.0 |
| 010 |
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|a 0-262-73121-5
|b br.
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| 010 |
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|a 0-262-23181-6
|b rel.
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| 010 |
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|a 978-0-262-73121-8
|b br.
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| 035 |
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|a (OCoLC)492601840
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| 100 |
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|a 20020919d1995 k y0frey0103 ba
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| 101 |
0 |
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|a eng
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| 102 |
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|a US
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| 105 |
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|a a a 001yy
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| 106 |
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|a r
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| 200 |
1 |
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|a Evolutionary game theory
|b Texte imprimé
|f Jörgen W. Weibull
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| 205 |
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|a 4th print.
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| 210 |
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|a Cambridge (Mass.)
|c MIT Press
|d cop.1995
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| 215 |
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|a 1 vol. (XV-265 p.)
|d 24 cm
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| 320 |
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|a Bibliogr.p. [255]-260. Index.
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| 330 |
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|a This text introduces current evolutionary game theory where ideas from evolutionary biology and rationalistic economics meet emphasizing the links between static and dynamic approaches and noncooperative game theory. Much of the text is devoted to the key concepts of evolutionary stability and replicator dynamics. The former highlights the role of mutations and the latter the mechanisms of selection. Moreover, set-valued static and dynamic stability concepts, as well as processes of social evolution, are discussed. Separate background chapters are devoted to noncooperative game theory and the theory of ordinary differential equations. There are examples throughout as well as individual chapter summaries.
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| 606 |
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|3 PPN02735525X
|a Théorie des jeux
|2 rameau
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| 606 |
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|3 PPN027288382
|a Économie politique
|x Modèles mathématiques
|2 rameau
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| 676 |
|
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|a 519.3
|v 20
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| 680 |
|
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|a QA269
|b .W45 1995
|
| 686 |
|
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|a I.2.3
|2 acm
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| 686 |
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|a G.3
|2 acm
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| 700 |
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1 |
|a Weibull
|b Jörgen W.
|4 070
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| 801 |
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3 |
|a FR
|b Abes
|c 20150710
|g AFNOR
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| 801 |
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|a FR
|b DYNIX_BUNAN
|c 19990201
|g AFNOR
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| 930 |
|
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|5 441092103:555965910
|b 441092103
|a 519.3 WEI
|j u
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| 979 |
|
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|a DEC
|
| 998 |
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|a 752935
|
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