Causation and laws of nature in early modern philosophy

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteur principal : Ott Walter R. (Auteur)
Format : Livre
Langue : anglais
Titre complet : Causation and laws of nature in early modern philosophy / Walter Ott
Publié : Oxford, New York, Auckland [etc.] : Oxford University Press , 2009
Description matérielle : 1 vol. (XII-260 p.)
Sujets :
Documents associés : Autre format: Causation and laws of nature in early modern philosophy
  • P. 1
  • Introduction
  • P. 5
  • Themes
  • P. 5
  • The origin and status of laws of nature
  • P. 10
  • The ontology of powers
  • P. 12
  • Necessity
  • P. 14
  • Models of causation
  • P. 16
  • Plan of the book
  • P. 20
  • The Aristotelian background
  • P. 20
  • Necessity
  • P. 27
  • The ontology of relations
  • P. 30
  • Manifest and occult qualities
  • Part I : The Cartesian predicament
  • P. 35
  • What mechanism isn't
  • P. 39
  • The rejection of Aristotelianism
  • P. 44
  • The nude wax : Cartesian ontology
  • P. 51
  • The laws of nature
  • P. 61
  • Force
  • P. 64
  • Occasionalism
  • P. 65
  • The concurrentist reading
  • P. 68
  • The argument from laws of nature
  • P. 70
  • Thoroughgoing occasionalism
  • P. 76
  • The problem of mental causation
  • Part II : The dialectic of occasionalism
  • P. 81
  • Malebranche and the cognitive model of causation
  • P. 82
  • The argument from nonsense
  • P. 83
  • The argument from elimination
  • P. 86
  • The divine concursus argument
  • P. 90
  • 'Little souls' revisited
  • P. 92
  • The 'no necessary connection' argument
  • P. 97
  • The epistemic argument
  • P. 102
  • Laws and divine volitions
  • P. 102
  • The content of divine volitions
  • P. 106
  • The problem of efficacious laws
  • P. 110
  • Causation and explanation
  • P. 112
  • A scholastic mechanism
  • P. 120
  • Régis against the occasionalists
  • Part III : Power and necessity
  • P. 135
  • A dead cadaverous thing
  • P. 140
  • Relations and powers
  • P. 151
  • Boyle's paradox
  • P. 157
  • Boyle and the concurrentists
  • P. 159
  • Locke on relations
  • P. 170
  • Locke on powers : the geometrical model
  • P. 177
  • Locke's mechanisms
  • P. 187
  • Conclusion
  • Part IV : Hume
  • P. 191
  • The two Humes
  • P. 197
  • Intentionality
  • P. 199
  • Meaning
  • P. 200
  • Against the positivist reading
  • P. 203
  • Signification
  • P. 206
  • Judgment and belief
  • P. 208
  • Semiotic empiricism
  • P. 210
  • Relative ideas
  • P. 215
  • The argument from nonsense
  • P. 219
  • Necessity
  • P. 219
  • Finding Hume's target
  • P. 222
  • Against the cognitive and geometrical models
  • P. 226
  • The neighboring fields
  • P. 228
  • The practicality requirement
  • P. 230
  • Relations
  • P. 230
  • The status of relations
  • P. 232
  • Two kinds of relations
  • P. 235
  • The nature of necessity
  • P. 238
  • The definition of causation
  • P. 238
  • The problem
  • P. 240
  • Subjectivism or projectivism ?
  • P. 247
  • Conclusion